Europe has a 'problem'; it is becoming a 'less cultural continent' as fewer Europeans are 'engaging in cultural activities'. This conclusion has been reached due to the findings of the latest cross national cultural participation survey. This paper questions the existence of this 'problem' and instead suggests that there is a shared problematisation across Europe sustained by common discursive archaeology that employs various discursive strands in relation to a dominant institutional discourse. The argument is that the 'problem' of 'non-participation' legitimates a 'solution' that predates its emergence: the state subsidy of arts organisations. The paper recaps the comparable problematisations that the researchers have previously identified in the policy texts of their respective countries. It progresses to consider three distinct but interwoven discursive strands upon which the problem representation in both countries, and potentially across Europe, appears to rely.
Introduction
Europe supposedly has a 'problem', it is becoming a 'less cultural continent' (European Commission 2013a) as fewer Europeans are 'engaging in cultural activities'. This conclusion has been reached due to the findings of the latest cross national cultural participation survey: The Eurobarometer -a Europe wide version of similar national studies that have become increasingly common in the last 30 years. And so the 'problem' of cultural participation -or more specifically the problem of 'non-participation' is one that is shared across the majority of Europe's members states. This paper proposes to consider this 'problem' as a problematisation sustained by discourses common to countries across Europe (the enlightenment discourse, the discourse of redistribution through the democratisation of culture and finally the discourse of social inclusion and cohesion). This problematisation persists irrespective of the specific findings of any particular survey because both the 'problem' and the conflicting positions related to it are a necessary part of an institutional discourse that gives them meaning. The 'problem' of 'non-participation' legitimates a 'solution' that predates its emergence: the state subsidy of specific types of arts organisations.
While traditionally, comparative policy analysis often seeks to identify the efficacy of the differing approaches taken by different countries to tackling policy 'problems', this paper instead compares two countries in order to identify a shared problematisation (Bacchi 2009 ). The countries in question are Denmark and Scotland, both of which measure cultural participation 1 rates and both of which have high levels of recorded participation relative to other European countries. In fact, according to the same Eurobarometer detailed above, Denmark enjoys the highest levels of active participation in Europe (European Commission 2013b, p. 10) . Likewise, the Scottish Government (SG) states that 90% of its population is 'engaged' with culture (SG 2014 ). Yet despite this apparent success, cultural policy in both countries suggests that there is still a 'problem' with cultural participation rates, so much so that it necessitates specific state intervention and the continued expenditure of public funds on the organisations with which the populace are not participating. After a brief discussion of the methodological framework used, the paper moves on to outlining the problematisation that Scotland and Denmark appear to share. In doing so, three distinct discourses are identified that appear interwoven as fundamental discursive strands within the problematisation of 'non-participation' in both countries, and arguably across Europe.
Cultural participation surveys
The reason for measuring cultural participation is rarely made clear. In answer to this question, UNESCO (2012) suggests that measurement is a way to secure citizens' rights to culture and help to address some of the definitional problems of cultural policy-making through providing a greater understanding of what presentday cultural participation is (UNESCO 2012, p. 10) . Thus, UNESCO has developed standard definitions and a framework for cultural statistics in order to allow comparison across countries and with a desire to facilitate a deeper understanding of cultural participation around the world. However, Schuster (2007) has offered an extensive discussion as to the difficulties of measuring cultural participation and in particular comparing international rates of cultural participation both through analysis of existing national studies and specifically commissioned cross-national research. Although a majority of studies share an individual's participation rate over a specified (retrospective) period of time as their dependent variable, he highlights that the 'certain crispness and precision' of cultural participation studies 'belies the difficulties and compromises entailed in their creation' and which limit the capacity for meaningful comparison. While studies such as Schuster's have clearly questioned the validity of the data produced by cultural participation surveys, their critique is primarily focused on the quality (or lack thereof) of the evidence they provide. The analysis tends to focus on the difficulty of accurately measuring 'cultural participation' rather than questioning the emergence and construction of the 'problem' that the surveys are designed to measure. In doing so, they fail to consider the discursive nature of these surveys, the extent to which their existence and enactment contributes to the creation and perpetuation of not only the 'problem' but also the subjectification of certain individuals through the acceptance of uncontested categories (Bacchi 2009 ). The present research takes a more argumentative, or interpretative position so as to allow for a more critical reflection on the 'problem' in question.
Method and methodology
This research has been shaped significantly by Bacchi's (2009) interpretive method for analysing and critiquing policy texts. Entitled What's the Problem Represented to Be and revolving around six core questions, the method focuses on both the meaning-making of policy formulation and the 'conceptual logics' that lend those meanings validity. In doing so, its aim is first to understand how particular policy 'problems' have been made manifest, nameable and describable (Foucault 1970 ) and how these manifestations are then discursively sustained. This understanding then allows the researcher to 'problematise the problematisations' that the policy under analysis is attempting to address.
Influenced by Foucault, this approach is concerned with the governmentality of the modern state. In particular, the way it establishes norms of desirable behaviour to which people as political subjects are expected to conform. In turn, these norms limit what it is possible to think, say or do about the perceived 'problem', and therefore conflicting representations become silenced, discounted or marginalised. Informed by social constructionism and concerned with the role that language plays in establishing 'the real', it argues that although many competing constructions of a 'problem' are possible, governments 'play a privileged role because their understandings "stick"' (Bacchi 2009, p. 33) . Although Bacchi's systematic method utilises six questions in order to analyse the chosen policy these questions need not be followed sequentially but should rather act as a heuristic framework within which the researcher conducts their analysis.
In this study, Bacci's method has informed the analysis of core policy papers and surveys from both countries. From Scotland, documents produced and published by the SG (e.g. Culture Delivers, 2008) and the latest Scottish Household Survey on People and Culture (2009) have been included. From Denmark, the latest cultural policy strategy Kultur for Alle, 2009 (Culture for All) and the latest participation survey (Bak et al. 2012 ) have been included. Further speeches and press releases in relation to recent government strategies or focus areas have also been analysed. The two primary types of documents considered (policy documents and surveys) work on different levels. Whereas the policy papers are strategic documents that are intended to work as guidelines for those individuals and organisations charged with delivering government objectives, surveys are intended to function as an information source back to the political level so as to inform and improve the development of strategy. However both types of document are of relevance when studying problematisations as both are discursive sites that simultaneously reinforce the problematisation and rely upon it for their meaning.
Denmark and Scotland: a shared problem representation
The following paragraphs offer a brief comparison of cultural policy in the two countries in addition to an analysis of contemporary policy documents, in order to evidence how the same problematisation is manifest in both Danish and Scottish cultural policy. Thus two previous pieces of research are recapped in which the tools used for measuring cultural participation in Scotland and Denmark had been analysed (Balling and Kann-Christensen 2013, Stevenson 2013) .
Cultural policy infrastructure and public spending At a macro level, Scotland and Denmark exhibit some broad similarities. Both have a population in the region of five and a half million that is primarily located in a few densely populated urban centres with the remainder spread over broad areas of rural countryside. Their citizens enjoy relatively high average salaries as part of a mixed economy and enjoy a significant welfare state financed by general taxation. In both countries, culture is represented at a ministerial level with a central government department that attempts to implement its policies and objectives via a range of other organisations and institutions with which they have various types of formal and informal relationships.
In Denmark, the Ministry of Culture 2 supervises and supports cultural provision at the national level via the funding of organisations and at the local level through (voluntary) cultural agreements with local authorities, support for cultural projects (via development grants), and via state block grants to municipalities. Thus, although 'official' cultural policy is primarily defined at a macro level, it is interpreted and delivered through a network of arms-length organisations and nondepartmental government bodies who are charged with subsidising and supervising the cultural sector in Denmark. The overarching and on-going cultural policy is regularly supplemented with specific focus areas, such as children's literacy and enthusiasm for reading. In these cases subsidies are ring-fenced to support those activities seen to best support delivery of the strategic objectives. The budget for culture in Denmark is generated through a combination of taxation and lottery funds with license fees supporting the provision of national television and radio. In Denmark approximately 22.7 billion DKK was set aside for culture in 2013 with approximately 57% appropriated by the state and 43% by municipal authorities (NYT fra Danmarks Statistik 2013). Focusing on the state level, this expenditure mainly supports institutions related to theatre, art, literature and architecture with the majority funding large-scale organisations working in these fields.
Although Scotland is not an independent country it is a semi-autonomous nation within a larger state. Having regained its own parliament in 1999, cultural policy is one of the areas in which the newly formed SG gained devolved power. However despite some specific policy actions diverging from those taken in the rest of the UK, at a macro level cultural policy in Scotland still appears broadly aligned with that of its southern neighbours. Schlesinger (2009) has argued that the first political administrations of devolution simply adopted the rhetoric and policies of the UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport, while Stevenson (2014a, p. 135 ) has suggested that although 'the rhetoric of Scottish cultural policy post-devolution might have become increasingly divergent from that found elsewhere in the UK, arguably less progress has been made in operationalising this rhetoric' (see Galloway and Jones 2010, Stevenson 2014b for a more extensive discussion of the development of cultural policy in Scotland).
However, leaving the specifics of the UK's constitutional arrangement to one side, on a more practical level a broadly similar network of governance exists in Scotland as can be found in Denmark. The Ministry for Culture and External Affairs provides a block grant to a number of organisations, not least Creative Scotland (CS) who has a remit of supporting the arts, film and creative industries. CS support a variety of individual artists and small to medium sized cultural organisations, but not the 14 major national organisations and companies 4 as they have a direct funding relationship with central government. As in Denmark, the SG makes use of ring-fenced funding in order to ensure certain strategic priorities are addressed, one of the largest of these being the Youth Music Initiative that supports music tuition in schools. Likewise, the majority of public spending on culture in Scotland subsidises large-scale professional organisations (CS 2011 , SG 2011 . In the 2012-2013 draft budgets, of the 149.2 million pounds set aside for culture, 65% is to support the provision of the 14 national organisations and companies (SG 2011) . Of the remaining 35%, distributed by CS, the majority primarily funds a network of theatre companies and galleries, (CS 2012) . In addition to each of these organisations with a national remit, there are 32 local authorities whose combined expenditure on culture from their own budget has consistently been greater than that of the SG since 1999 (Bonnar 2014) .
Increasing cultural participation -breaking down barriers Turning now to the cultural policy documents of Denmark and Scotland it becomes clear that the cultural policy of both countries includes a commitment to increasing cultural participation. The current coalition government agreement in Denmark echoes the principle desire of the core cultural policy that they inherited from the previous government: Culture for All (Kulturministeriet 2009 'fully committed to widening engagement with culture for all communities and individuals' and that they desire 'for access to, and participation in, cultural activities to be as wide as possible'. (SG 2010) These commitments to increasing cultural participation manifest themselves in various types of activities and interventions. These are primarily intended to address different types of 'barriers' that are seen to be limiting the capacity of some to access and 'participate in culture'. At one end of the spectrum these policy actions can be broad and un-targeted such as free access to state museums and galleries or financial support for touring work to more remote locations; policies that have been adopted in both Denmark and Scotland. At the other end, more focused interventions include the subsidy of theatre tickets for certain demographic groups or time limited 'outreach and engagement' projects with certain 'communities' defined in various ways. 'Barriers' are one of the discursive keywords in the problem representation and are primarily represented as being demographic, environmental, socioeconomic or psychological. Furthermore, in both countries, removing these 'barriers' is presented as being one of the primary interventions that cultural policy should focus on. In both Denmark and Scotland any organisation receiving public funding must be seen to have a clear strategy for engaging those who are statistically absent from their audiences. For example, in Scotland, any organisation receiving funding from CS are required to 'work collaboratively and imaginatively to increase opportunities for people to engage and participate' (CS 2014b, emphasis added). While in Denmark, large cultural institutions such as the Royal Theatre, the National Museum and the National Gallery of Denmark all have contracts with the Ministry of Culture that include objectives which require them to 'provide its art to audiences of all kinds', 'engage in dialogue with a broader audience' or 'break down barriers' (Finansministeriet 2014) . What is interesting is that both national and international surveys do not appear to show that either economic, geographic nor psychological barriers are the main reason for non-participation. Rather it is a lack of interest or lack of time that is the main barrier (Bak et al. 2012 , p. 329, European Commission 2013b . In the Danish survey, it is concluded, 'Very few experience cultural or social barriers' (Bak et al. 2012) .
However the dominant use of this keyword within the discourses of cultural policy stresses the structural factors to the detriment of individual agency and thus contributes to those not currently 'participating' being represented in one of two ways. Firstly, as people who have the desire to participate and engage but are limited in some manner in their capacity to fulfil that desire. Alternatively, as people whose lack of interest is due to a lack of understanding caused by the extent to which 'barriers' have limited their ability to participate in the past. While the authors do not seek to suggest that structural inequalities do not exist that may account for some patterns of behaviour, what is proposed is that in both of the primary representations of 'non-participants' the possibility that they may have made an active choice to use their time in another manner is not considered. Neither is the degree to which the structural inequalities that do exist may be limiting their capacity to 'participate' with cultural activities and organisations that do not receive public subsidy. As the recent Warwick commission acknowledged, while it is troubling that the wealthiest, better educated and least ethnically diverse 8% of the UK population makes most use of publically subsidised cultural organisations and events (and thus enjoys a significantly higher public spend per head on their cultural interests) what the focus on these figures obscures is that the 'participation gap' 'is not caused by a lack of demand among the public for cultural and creative expression ' (2014, p. 33) . Indeed the work carried out by Bennett et al. (2009) presents clear evidence of the rich and diverse nature of people's everyday lives.
Measuring cultural participation -reproducing dichotomies and categories Denmark has a particularly long history of measuring cultural participation and surveys have been conducted on a regular basis since the early 1960s. 6 The objectives of the surveys have changed gradually over the years (see also Balling and Kann-Christensen 2013) and early surveys had a more explicit focus on citizens' leisure time, both in terms of the amount of it and how it was used. Furthermore, and potentially due to them having been conducted during a period in which average working hours were gradually reduced and holidays increased, the early surveys were based on a broad concept of culture; asking about a spectrum of activities that spanned gardening to museum visits. Come the 90s and 00s and the focus shifted towards attendance (i.e. to what extent the citizens used cultural institutions, in particular those that were the recipients of public subsidy).
The primary objective of the 1993 survey was 'to provide an overview of participation in cultural activities' (Fridberg 1994, p. 9) and to 'illuminate the cultural habits of the population from the age of 7 and upwards (…). The 2004 and 2012 surveys have the same focus but elaborate it further by including 'changes in activities and patterns of use due to new cultural possibilities and activities' as well as a stated desire to focus on priorities of the citizens (Bille et al. 2005 , p. 13, Bak et al. 2012 .
The primary measurement tool of cultural participation in Scotland is the rolling Scottish Household Survey (see McCall and Playford 2012 for a discussion). While more probing questions about perceptions and barriers are asked on a less regular basis as part of a culture and sport 'module' of this survey, the two consistently asked questions focus on attendance at, and participation in a given list of 'cultural' activities. These figures are then rolled up so as to give a headline engagement figure for the country. This figure is reported on a yearly basis as one of the SG's 50 national indicators through which they measure and track progress towards delivering the 'national outcomes' and delivery of the government's 'single purpose': the delivery of sustainable economic growth (SG 2014) .
The key binary evident in the cultural policy documents of both Denmark and Scotland is between those that do 'participate' or 'engage' 7 and those that don't. The lack of action by those who do not 'participate' is represented as being a result of their failure to understand the benefits they would accrue through 'participation' (culture as a merit good) and by association their failure to understand the 'value' of 'culture. Despite the fact that the 'value of culture' is something that eludes all those that try to measure it, a dichotomy is presented between those who 'value' and 'celebrate' 'culture' and those that don't. To the extent that in Scotland, CS feels that its work will support Scotland becoming a place where 'everyone, everywhere, is interested and curious about creativity' (CS 2014a, p. 7). The implicit suggestion being that this is not the case currently. The SG identifies '[t]hose living in the most deprived areas, older people, [and] those with a disability or longstanding illness' (SG 2008a) along with those on lower incomes and with no or fewer qualifications (SG 2008b) as being much less likely to take part in a cultural activity. In Denmark, as in Scotland, these non-participants are primarily identified as a conglomeration of other demographic groups all of which require special intervention in order to allow 'culture' to 'reach' them: 'Non-participants are a variety of groups, including young people, immigrants and socially disadvantaged' (Kulturministeriet 2009, p. 10) . In both cases policies stress the need for special action to reach out or 'target' these groups (SG 2008a , Kulturministeriet 2009 ).
The problem representation
The discussion above is intended to show that the two countries' policies on cultural participation exhibit a discursive affinity indicative of a shared problem representation -that of the 'non-participation' of those citizens from certain demographics who do not have some sort of involvement with certain types of publicly funded cultural activities and organisations. However the evidence for this argument does not lie solely in the manner which high level surveys are constructed and conducted but also in relation to the manner in which they are analysed, presented, discussed and acted upon. To a varying degree, the participation surveys considered measure a variety of cultural activities (museums, theatre, libraries, TV, sport, leisure time activities, computer use, etc.) that exceed a simple suggestion that what is of concern is participation with 'high culture'. Nevertheless, when it comes to identifying 'non-participants' a more narrow understanding of 'culture' is employed. For example, the latest Danish survey contains an analysis of non-participants where the quantitative approach is expanded with qualitative group interviews. The survey has been subdivided into three main categories: Art & Culture, Leisure Time, and Media. Art & Culture includes concerts, theatre, film, museums, libraries and books, whereas media, sports and computer games are left out. The analysis of non-participants' reasons for their non-participation is based on the opinions of those not participating in the cultural activities contained in this first category alone (Bak et al. 2012, p. 330) . Gripsrud et al. (2011, p. 523) suggests that new media and increased access to internet contributes to the privatisation of cultural consumption. Technology improves the possibilities for cultural consumption at home but in the latest Danish survey activities related to new media and the internet do not 'count' once it comes to identification of the 'non-participant' (see also Balling and Kann-Christensen 2013, Stevenson 2013) . From this perspective around 1/3 of the populace in Denmark are thus understood to be non-participants in need of some sort of intervention by government via publicly funded cultural organisations; the 'solution' to the 'problem' of 'non-participation' primarily being related to attendance at, or interaction with, the organisations that receive state support.
It is the authors' assertion therefore that the dominant discourse of cultural participation in both Scotland and Denmark creates a category of citizen who would be required to alter the use of their leisure time so as to align with a normative position of 'valuing', 'celebrating' and 'engaging' in 'culture' through 'participation' with primarily state supported cultural organisations. However it is important to consider that the majority of the organisations people are encouraged to 'participate' with were not established in order to address the 'problem' of cultural 'non-participation'. In the majority of cases their establishment pre-dates the emergence of the 'problem' for which they are now the apparent solution. Many of the cultural organisations that receive the majority of state subsidies in Scotland and Denmark were established at other times, for other reasons, but their existence is arguably now simultaneously both the cause and solution to the 'problem' in question. If the 'non-participation' of certain individuals with the organisations upon which their taxes are spent was understood as a legitimate subjective choice then the 'problem' of 'non-participation' would be significantly different and of a far more political nature.
As it is constructed the problematisation renders 'the problem' technical and thus solvable. It is presented as a question of 'barriers' that can be removed through rational actions based on objective evidence. It is not the intention of the authors to suggest that there are not individuals for whom the structural inequalities in society do mean that they face limitations in pursuing the cultural activities in which they are most interested. Rather, it is the extent to which there is an obscuration of an alternative problem representation, one of 'relevance as well as accessibility' (Warwick Commission 2014, p. 34).
The discursive strands of contemporary cultural participation policies Through the identification of a discursive affinity, this paper has thus far argued that Scottish and Danish policy share a common problem representation in relation to the 'non-participation' with 'culture' of certain groups in society. The argument now moves on to consider three broader discourses present in both Scottish and Danish society, each of which have been employed in legitimating state subsidies for the arts. It will be suggested that these discourses, central to the construction of a European understanding of a 'good' society, help to explain why the same problem representation appears to have been constructed not only in the two countries in question, but across much of Europe. This assumption can be made given the extent to which the European Commission has felt it necessary to undertake research and publish guidelines so as to 'set directions and provide Member States with recommendations on providing better access to culture and participation in it' (Tomka 2013, p. 260) . While each of these discourses have emerged independently and enjoyed distinct periods of prominence in relation to the discursive field of cultural policy, they should not be understood in a linear historical sense in which the emergence of one eradicates the possibility of the other. Over time, these three discourses that have been employed to legitimate state subsidised cultural organisations and activities have become intertwined in a discursive knot that is central to the problematisation of the 'non-participant' in the cultural policies of Denmark and Scotland.
The discourse of enlightenment Both Danish and Scottish 8 cultural policy draws on a discourse of 'culture' that originated in the Enlightenment and which is predicated on a belief in the potential for 'culture' to foster an educated and cultivated people. As a way to understand the value associated with 'cultural participation' in this discourse it is worth briefly recapping the key components of its discursive archaeology. The Enlightenment, and the rise of liberal humanism that accompanied it, saw a discourse of 'culture' in which it was celebrated for its capacity to support the development of the 'enlightened' citizen through developing what is understood in the German Romantic tradition as the Bildung of the individual. The notion of 'culture' within this discourse has its etymology in the Latin term 'cultura' that relates to the agricultural processes of cultivating land and crops. This metaphor of growth has a classical pedigree, given that Cicero talks about 'cultura amini': the cultivation of the mind, both as self-development and as a pedagogical process that all children should undergo (Fink 1988 ). It is not simply a process but simultaneously the intended outcome of the process -a cultured citizen. Within this discourse 'culture' is most commonly understood as specific cultural artefacts and activities, as opposed to more anthropological understandings of 'culture' that are bound up with the way different people live and which it would be impossible to avoid. 'Culture' is represented as something that everybody could and should devote themselves to so as to become educated and cultivated citizens, fit to perform their role in society to the best of their abilities.
In Denmark, support for cultural institutions and artists primarily began as an expression of the interests of the aristocratic ruling class of the sixteenth century. It was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the growing influence of the bourgeoisie that an increasing number of organisations were established and supported, including The Royal Academy, The Royal Library and the Royal Theatre (Engberg 2001) . With the end of absolutism and the introduction of the Danish Constitution in 1849 the state took over the funding of culture. Cultural policy as an aim to educate the population is strongest in relation to the establishment of the Danish public libraries which is dated to the first Library Act in 1920. The purpose of the public library was to enlighten the whole population through transformation: 'to develop the random reading into serious reading and generally to encourage the library user to move into a better category of reading' (Skouvig 2007) . In the UK the government first began to take a role in the 'provision' of culture to the populace in the nineteenth century. This legislation manifested itself primarily in the creation of public libraries, art galleries and museums, although many of these were as much a product of bequests that were received as any conscious desire to enter a new area of policy (Gray 2000) . Until this point, the majority of state involvement with the arts had been one focused on the control of artistic production, through censorship and licensing (Gray 2000) . However O'Neill (2008) argues that these sorts of publicly funded institutions were often established on the basis of their supposed capacity to educate and civilise the populace, a belief predicated on the enlightenment discourse of 'culture' outlined above.
When considering the full spectrum of 'culture' that receives public funding today, it is not only the classical art forms most associated with the ruling classes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (literature, art, theatre) that are supported. Likewise the anachronistic terminology of 'civilising the populace' is no longer employed. However it remains the case that the discourse of 'non-participation' is concerned with participation in those specific art forms and institutions identified by a group of elites as being capable of providing a 'transformative' experience that will produce 'enriched' citizens capable of contributing to society in an appropriate manner. This discourse is evident in numerous policy texts e.g. in the Scottish policy document Culture Delivers, in which it is stressed that ' [t] here is clear quantitative and qualitative evidence of the positive transformational impact of cultural and creativity activity on individuals' which thus supports the assertion that cultural activities can be 'targeted at people at risk [to] provide diversionary activities and make a positive impact on the incidence of crime and anti-social behaviour' (SG 2008a) . Even though the rhetoric in Denmark is somewhat softer, the discourse is clear -art and culture has a positive impact on citizens development as it 'sparks reflection and insight' and 'shapes us as citizens' (Kulturministeriet 2014) .
The discourse of redistribution and the democratisation of culture As discussed above, 'barriers' are one of the discursive keywords in both Scottish and Danish cultural policy. The assumption being that these are impeding people from 'participating' in the sort of culture that unimpeded they would 'naturally' want to. Indeed one of the two objectives set out at the inception of the Danish Ministry of Cultural Affairs in 1961 was to secure access to art and culture for every citizen (Jeppesen 2002 , p. 31, Duelund 2003 . This policy objective is most commonly understood as one concerned with 'the democratization of culture', a strategy focused on breaking down economic and geographic barriers to 'the arts'. This strategy is well described (see i.e. Skot-Hansen 1999 , Jeppesen 2002 , Duelund 2003 but in essence it is concerned with providing access to those cultural activities and objects that had historically been seen as the preserve of the elite; be that the aristocracy or the ruling bourgeoisie. More specifically it means that although the state accepts some degree of responsibility to meet the mental, spiritual, and cultural needs of the population, it is predicted on a presumption that the state (or their chosen 'arms-length' representative) knows best how these needs are to be met. This position is closely connected to the European model of the redistributive welfare state (Duelund 2003) ; the core assumption of which is that the wealth of a society should be evenly distributed amongst its population. The 'culture' that is contained or produced in the museums, theatres and concerts halls that receive public subsidy is understood as part of the intangible wealth of the nation and should not therefore be the preserve of any one group.
Evidence of this discourse is present throughout the language of post-war cultural policy in Denmark and Scotland. For example, the 1975 Danish participation survey is described as a tool for politicians to think about if there was 'motivation for a change in the unequal distribution of intangible wealth in society (Kühl and Koch-Nielsen 1976, p. 9) . Likewise, when the Arts Council of Great Britain was established in 1946, its stated aim was to deliver 'the best to the most' (Sinclair 1995) . The implicit suggestion in this language being that 'the most' lacked access to cultural capital to the same degree that they lacked access to financial capital.
This discourse of an ethical obligation to redistribute the cultural capital of society is still present in contemporary cultural policy. In the Danish policy document Culture for All, it is stressed that 'all Danes should be able to participate in relevant cultural activities. Everybody should feel welcome. And everybody should be able to participate. There is no art that is too difficult' (Kulturministeriet 2009, p. 4) . Correspondingly, the Scottish minister with responsibility for culture stated in a speech: 'I believe that culture and heritage in Scotland is of us all and for us all, so I want to talk also about access and participation and how we work to enable all of Scotland's communities to benefit, not just from the great cultural wealth and heritage of this nation, but also the world's' (Hyslop 2013) .
The policy actions associated with this discourse of redistribution could, from one perspective, be seen as a success. As noted in the introduction, the latest participation surveys show that up to 90% of the populaces in both countries 'participate' in cultural activities. Yet despite this, 'non-participation' with culture continues to be represented as growing 'problem'. In spite of a half a century of 'breaking down barriers' in order to 'democratise culture', many individuals and groups remain absent (Warwick 2014).
The discourse of social inclusion and cohesion
The most recent discourse upon which the rhetoric of cultural participation policies is constructed is related to the role that 'culture' has in connecting people as communities, societies and nations. In a Scottish context it is stated that: 'Cultural activity can add to a local community's positive reputation, and contribute to positive perceptions of the nation as a whole' (SG 2008a, p. 12) . In an era of increasingly multicultural and economically unequal societies, concerns about the dissolution of a 'common' or 'shared' identity, have allowed cultural policy to be seen as an opportunity to promote 'a common culture that transcends the social, political and cultural divisions of the nation' (Kawashima 2006 p. 64) . Although a distinct discourse in its own right, this draws upon both of the previously mentioned discourses in relying upon the notion of a universal aesthetic and a focus on the redistribution of cultural (rather than financial) capital. In the UK, as part of their move towards a political 'third-way', the new Labour Government of 1997 stopped talking about tackling poverty and began to speak of addressing social exclusion. When Peter Mandelson announced the creation of the Social Exclusion Unit he stated that social exclusion was 'about more than poverty and unemployment. It is about being cut off from what the rest of us see as normal life' (emphasis added). Those excluded were 'the growing number of our fellow citizens who lack the means, material or otherwise, to participate in economic, social, cultural and political life in Britain today ' (Mandelson 1997 cited in Stephenson, 2011 .
This discourse was further supported by the correlation commonly found across many cultural participation surveys that suggests those most likely to be socially 'excluded' (for example those from lower socio-economic backgrounds and migrants) were also most likely to be a 'cultural non-participant'. As the Danish cultural strategy states when discussing who 'non-users' are: '[they] are a variety of groups, including young people, immigrants and the socially disadvantaged' (Kulturministeriet 2009, p. 10) . These groups' 'non-participation' was pointed to as evidence of their 'exclusion' and thus facilitating their 'participation was synonymous with facilitating their 'inclusion'. Whilst in Denmark this discursive strand was never given the explicit title it gained in Scotland and the UK, it was still present, informed not least by the rise of multiculturalism that was increasingly informing public policy across Europe. In discussing a new project called Denmark Reads, the Minister of Culture evoked the cohesive and inclusive nature of cultural activities when she stated that: 'Literature helps to bind us together as a country. We use it to understand ourselves and the society that surrounds us. Literature opens the lifeblood of our democracy: conversation and dialogue' (Kulturstyrelsen 2014) .
What is interesting to note is the extent to which one policy text can employ all three strands to justify the desire to increase 'cultural participation' (and in doing so legitimate state subsidies for existing arts and cultural organisations) despite the inherent tensions that exist between them. For example, while the discourses of enlightenment and redistribution rely upon the legitimacy of the elite expert and canonical culture, the discourse of social inclusion ostensibly values the individual to a degree that problematises the expert's role significantly. Likewise, while the discourses of redistribution and social inclusion often stress the need for a transformation in some of the structures of society, the discourse of enlightenment stresses the need for a transformation in the individual and the contribution they can make to society. Yet these tensions are negotiated by virtue of the assertion common to all these discourse that it is unproblematic to understand any and all 'cultural participation' as beneficial for both the individual and the society in which they live. While Tepper's (2011) study about protests over art and culture in America might be a good starting point to critique this unifying assumption, there is not the scope in this paper to do so at present.
Concluding discussion
This paper has argued that there is a shared problem representation in Scotland and Denmark where 'non-participants' are constructed as individuals from certain demographics that do not interact with specific types of publicly subsidised cultural activities and organisations. The problem representation is to a large degree defined through the way in which 'cultural participation' is measured and the type of actions that are put in place in relation to these measurements. What counts as cultural participation in surveys remains primarily related to what one might call 'the arts' and in particular, attendance at state funded cultural organisations. This is despite a persistent conflicting discourse that calls for a broader understanding of 'cultural participation' -perhaps most explicitly promoted by UNESCO -not to mention the extent to which digitisation has diversified the ways in which people might now be 'participating' in 'culture' (Tepper and Ivey 2008, Gripsrud et al. 2011) . It has been suggested that fundamental to this shared problem representation are three discourses that have been of equal importance in the discursive construction of the modern European state and which have been woven together in the problematisation of cultural 'non-participation'. To conclude, some consideration will now be given to what discursive 'work' this problematisation 'does' that might explain why it continues to be employed not only in Denmark and Scotland but across Europe as a whole.
In a market economy, when the state does intervene, it must be seen to be for a purpose (Gray 2000, p. 38) . Simplistically, that purpose must either be the protection of the populace or the improvement of their lives to some degree. These purposes legitimate the transference of personal wealth from the individual to the state but in order to do so, the interventions and their outcomes must be seen to be legitimate themselves. In light of the finical crisis of 2007 and the subsequent budgetary constraint shown by many governments, this necessity for legitimacy has gained increasing prominence, as debates about what public spending should be cut have become increasingly common. In a 2014 speech, Harriet Harman, UK Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, stated that ' [t] here is a democratic imperative for the arts to show why the hard-pressed taxpayer -struggling with the cost of living crisis -should fund the arts' (2014). Kangas and Vestheim (2010) indicate that a similar challenge faces cultural institutions in Denmark. Indeed even before the financial crisis, Holden (2006) had written of a contemporary 'crisis of legitimacy' faced by the subsidised cultural sector in which those receiving funding would need to turn to the public in order to gain the necessary support for their continued subsidies.
This proposal evokes Moore's (1995) assertion that any publicly funded organisation has a clear understanding of what their raison d'être is in the eyes of citizens, and that only by measuring success against these 'refined public preferences' (Coates and Passmore 2008) can they gain the approval of what Moore describes as the 'external authorising environment ' (1995, p. 34) . However, this 'crisis of legitimacy' is not new. To some degree state expenditure on culture has always been in question, and it is perhaps more accurate to suggest that the 'crisis' is rather that the previous means of legitimacy -the logic of 'democratic elitism' in which various 'experts' and the organisations they work for make decisions on behalf of an institutionally-separate public (Gray 2012, p. 507 ) -has become increasingly challenged in the market oriented, liberal individualistic Europe of the twenty-first century. The slow demise of 'objective expertise' in legitimating the 'value' of cultural subsidy and the organisations they support has been accompanied by the rise of 'objective evidence' to fill its place. The increasing importance of measuring cultural participation is a consequence of this, as governments arguably seek to show increasing rates of participation, and thus by inference, popular support for the 'culture' they subsidise. From this perspective the 'problem' of 'non-participation' is not a 'problem' for those who are not participating, but rather it is a problem for those organisations and activities that receive public subsidy and yet attract a small percentage of the population to partake in what that subsidy supports.
Yet the 'value' of cultural organisations and thus the justification for their state support need not solely rely on their use. Holden (2004) highlights the 'non-use values' of cultural organisations as being equally important. These values encompass potential societal benefits such as the ability of these organisations to offer visibility and prestige internationally and the legacy that they provide from one generation to the next. So why then do cultural organisations and governments in both Scotland and Denmark primarily seek to legitimise continued subsidy through pointing to their attempts to increase use and in doing so represent the 'non-participation' or 'non-use' by some as a 'problem' that they must been seen to be attempting to address? This paper argues that it is because of the three discourses discussed, each of which has enjoyed various points of prominence in legitimating subsidies for cultural organisations in the past, but all of which are now interwoven into the current problematisation of cultural 'non-participation'. The narrative of each of these discourses is predicated upon a physical interaction between the 'culture' receiving subsidy and the populace. The individual cannot be enlightened and enriched at a distance. Intangible societal wealth cannot be redistributed to those who are not there to collect it. The 'excluded' cannot be 'included' if they continue to be absent from what is deemed 'normal'.
As such, 'non-use' can never be accepted as unproblematic, or even to be expected considering DiMaggio's (1978) proposal that any attempts to facilitate universal participation are bound to fail given that one of the key functions of culture is for one social group to differentiate themselves from another. Doing so would significantly problematise the legitimacy of state funded 'culture' as the archaeology of their discursive legitimacy has always presupposed 'use' or 'participation' as a given in relation to their societal value, while simultaneously implying that those who do not 'participate' suffer from a 'cultural deficit' that limits their capacity to be a fully cultivated and included citizen, unable to generate cultural capital of their own. It cannot be accepted that some people might gain exactly the same benefits through other activities or that it is conceivably the case that 'most people's cultural needs and aspirations are being met, for better or worse, […] by the market as goods and services ' (Garnham, cited in McGuigan 2004, p. 42) .
Denying or blurring historical divisions questions the very distinctiveness of what it is that cultural subsidies and the organisations they support are 'providing' to the individuals whose taxation finances them. It would bring into question the very existence of the 'non-participant'; a discursive subject upon which the legitimacy of state funding for existing cultural organisations relies significantly. For ironically the solution to the 'problem' of 'non-participation' is the continued subsidy of the very organisations with which the 'non-participants' are not participating. Overcoming their own failure to attract a majority of the populace as 'participants' becomes central to their raison d'être. What this papers argues is that as such, cultural participation policies in Scotland and Denmark are not orientated towards the particular and specific problems that individuals may face in 'participating' in their preferred modes of culture. Instead they are primarily orientated towards the 'problem' of legitimising the organisations that are a legacy of decisions made by previous generations. In seeking to evidence the value of the existing cultural infrastructure through the proxy of participation, cultural policy in Scotland and Denmark continues to overlook the cultural values of the heterogeneous communities that make up their citizenry. In doing so, access continues to be privileged over relevance and quantitative equality continues to trump qualitative equity.
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